HORACE *C.* 1.34: POETIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL EQUIVOCATION

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All interpreters of Horace *C.* 1.34 from Porphyrio to Reckford and Nisbet and Hubbard have one thing in common: they read the poem as a statement about personal philosophic and religious beliefs. Horace says that he must undergo a change (1–5a) as a result of witnessing a portent—Jupiter has thundered in a clear sky (5b–8). The portent brings about a new, or renewed, awareness in the power of the gods, which Horace had failed to acknowledge. Horace reflects that divine power (*deus*) and Fortuna have control over men's lives (12–16).

Porphyrio's introductory comment on the ode established a critical baseline for the interpretation of the poem:

> hac ode significat se penitentiam agere, quod Epicuream sectam secutus inreligiosus extiterit.[1]

Horace was recanting his Epicurean beliefs. According to Epicurus and his followers, thunder in a clear sky was a physical impossibility. All natural phenomena were to be explained rationally and scientifically. Lucretius in a passage cited by many commentators (6.400 f.) ridicules the commonly-held belief that Jupiter sends signs of his will to men through thunder and other portents. The gods do not concern themselves with human affairs. So when Horace seems to confess that he has made a mistake in failing to worship the gods sufficiently (*Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens* 1.34.1), when he renounces an *insaniens sapientia*, and when his recognition of the error is precipitated by a flagrantly un-Epicurean natural event, he is, some have concluded, forswearing past Epicurean beliefs.

[1] *Acronis et Porphyrionis Commentarii in Q. Horatium Flaccum*, ed. F. Hauthal (Leipzig 1859) vol. 1.

To many readers the opening of the ode has seemed a serious declaration of a religious conversion. The poem has been read as evidence for personal religious feeling among the Romans by two eminent students of Roman religion, F. Altheim and A. D. Nock.[2] R. Heinze found the tone of the poem to be extraordinarily serious and intense.[3] According to A. Oltramare,[4] 1.34 is the only lyric in which Horace expresses genuine religious feeling.

If Horace did experience a religious conversion, he must have been converted to something. In the views of J. Cruquius (Antwerp 1578), A. Oltramare and A. Y. Cambell, Horace adopted Stoicism or moved in the direction of Stoic plus Eclectic beliefs.[5] To many, however, he seems to have reaffirmed a belief in the power of the gods.[6] But it is difficult to reconcile Horace's alleged youthful belief in careless gods with the word *relictos* in *relictos cursus*, for Horace seems to say

[2] A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford 1933) 7 ff., and F. Altheim, *A History of Roman Religion* (New York 1937) 372 and 532 note 2.

[3] Heinze's view, set forth in his introduction to the ode (Q. *Horatius Flaccus, Oden und Epoden*, erklärt von A. Kiessling, besorgt von R. Heinze, [Berlin 1930⁷]), represents a departure from the interpretation of A. Kiessling, as set forth in his introduction to the ode in Q. *Horatius Flaccus, Oden und Epoden* (Berlin 1890²). According to Kiessling, Horace returns to an earlier, youthful belief in the power of Jupiter and his daughter Fortuna. K. Büchner in *Bursians Jahresberichte* 267 (1939) 14, disagrees with Heinze's view:

> c. 1,34 wird biographisch gedeutet und bitterster Ernst darin gesehen. Eine Bekehrung, vielleicht ein Produkt langer Zeit, ist durch einen Blitzschlag symbolisiert. Nicht empfunden ist, glaube ich, die Ironie der Begründung. V. 7 *plerumque*, das doch alles aufhebt, kann nicht ernst gemeint sein, ebensowenig die Beziehung auf den Lehrsatz des Epikur–Horaz ist sonst nicht der Mann, der unter den Geheimnissen der Natur leidet wie etwa Lukrez.

Lambinus' view of the poem (Q. *Horatius Flaccus, Ex Fide Atque Auctoritate decem librorum manuscriptorum*, opera Dionysij Lambini . . . emendatus, [Venice 1566]) was as extreme as that of Heinze. He states as the reason for Horace's change the fact that the poet was "deorum metu non inani perterritus."

[4] A. Oltramare, "Horaz et la Religion de Virgile," *REL* 13 (1935) 305.

[5] A. Y. Campbell, *Horace: A New Interpretation* (London 1924) 121 f. L. Müller (Q. *Horatius Flaccus, Oden und Epoden*. [St. Petersburg 1900]) considers 1.34 to be one of the first poems in which Horace expresses his turning away from a complete faith in Epicureanism in the direction of Stoicism. Oltramare believes that 1.34 was written with Vergil in mind. Horace alludes to a shocking and unexpected stroke of destiny, the fall of Cornelius Gallus. The view of R. Hanslik, "Die Religiosität des Horaz," *Das Altertum* 1 (1955) 235, is similar.

[6] So F. Doering (Oxford 1838²), A. Macleane (London 1881), L. Müller, P. Shorey and G. Laing (Chicago 1919), E. C. Wickham (Oxford 1896), and C. L. Smith (Boston 1903²) in their commentaries.

that he did believe in the gods at some earlier time. If Horace had come to believe in the power of the gods, in which god or gods does the poet place his faith? In the course of the poem Horace moves from *deorum* (1) to *Diespiter* (5) to *deus* (13) to *Fortuna* (15). What is the relation among these divinities; most important, what is the connection between Diespiter and Fortuna?[7]

Still other scholars have maintained that Horace did not abandon his customary Epicureanism in this poem. In 1681 M. Dacier humbly requested his readers to consider the possibility that Horace did not recant his Epicurean beliefs, but meant to assert that his adherence to them was stronger than ever. The thunder portent was intended as ridicule of Stoic beliefs. Dacier, reading *plerumque* with *egit*, not *dividens*, argued that Horace's assertion that Jupiter generally thundered in a clear sky was patently false and ridiculous.[8] L. A. MacKay also argues that 1.34 is "a very strong and uncompromising declaration of extreme Epicurean faith."[9]

Many scholars have abandoned attempts to explain Horace's poem through Stoic and Epicurean beliefs about supernatural forces. The first to do so seems to have been G. Lessing, the German playwright and critic, who believed that 1.34 is a record of the thoughts which occurred to Horace at the moment when he witnessed a thunder portent.[10] In Lessing's view the conversion which Horace experienced

[7] W. W. Jaeger, G. Pasquali, and A. Delatte have different views of the significance of Fortuna. According to Jaeger, "Horace *C.* 1.34," *Hermes* 48 (1913) 442–49, Fortuna or Tyche is "an import from the great greenhouse of Hellenistic cult and foreign religion which Asia bestowed upon Rome." The association of Fortuna with the *apex* (line 14) suggested to Jaeger the Tyche cult of oriental dynasties—the notion that the power of kings comes from the gods. Jaeger argues that Jupiter and his thunder and lightning are only signs of Fortuna's power, but Horace, like the Stoics, connects this Fortune with fate. Pasquali, *Orazio Lirico* (Florence 1924) 588 ff., believes that Horace's Fortuna is the Hellenistic Tyche, but suggests that the Stoic notion that Fortune is malignant only in appearance also comes into play. Delatte, "La Conversion d'Horace (Ode I,34)," *AC* 4 (1935) 293–307, finds that in Horace's poem Tyche, Goddess of Destiny, has taken over Jupiter's traditional functions. In explaining the relation of the second part of the poem to the first, he notes that according to Etrusco-Roman beliefs, thunder is a celestial sign announcing that a celestial crown was going to change heads. Büchner (above, note 3) 133, finds Delatte's position unconvincing.

[8] M. Dacier, *Remarque critique sur les œuvres d'Horace* (Paris 1681).

[9] L. A. MacKay, "Horace: Odes I 34, 35," *CR* 43 (1929) 10 f.

[10] G. Lessing, *Rettungen des Horaz* (Stuttgart 1874) 31–40. In the view of L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge 1951²) 27, the poem does not record a

was political. The "gods" in whom he comes to believe are Julius and Augustus Caesar; *insana* (Lessing's substitution for *insaniens*) *sapientia* describes his past alignment with Brutus.

No one other than Lessing seems to have believed that Horace's conversion was primarily political. R. Hanslik, in the article cited above (note 5), took the position that Horace experienced a political conversion which was accompanied by changes in his religious and philosophic beliefs. For many readers, the closing statement of the poem—Fortuna at whim takes away and bestows the *apex*—has suggested a connection with contemporary politics. E. C. Wickham and K. J. Reckford[11] believe that the *apex* refers to the Parthians and is probably an allusion to the fall of Tiridates in 25 B.C. Oltramare, we recall, saw an allusion to the fall of Cornelius Gallus in 26. H. Plüss,[12] W. Wili,[13] and J. Perret[14] opt for the battle of Actium.

Others, however, have interpreted the *Fortuna* statement in more general terms. In the view of E. Fraenkel,

> The dogmas of the philosophers and their metaphysical and theological systems were of but subordinate interest to Horace; what did excite him throughout his life was the spectacle of Fortune's ruthless sport and the lesson a wise man should draw from it.[15]

According to V. Pöschl, the ode expresses a dichotomy often found in Horace's lyrics—the division between the private and poetical world, where Epicurean values predominate,[16] on the one hand, and the public

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permanent change in religious or philosophic belief. This is also the position of C. Bione, *Un Momento lirico e religioso di Orazio* (Bologne 1932). This study was not available to me, but it is summarized by Büchner (above, note 3).

[11] K. J. Reckford, "Horace, Odes 1.34: An Interpretation," *Univ. of N. Carolina Studies in Philology* 63 (1966) 511 and note 18.

[12] H. Plüss, *Horazstudien* (Leipzig 1882) 8.

[13] W. Wili, *Horaz und die augusteische Kultur* (Basel 1948) 120–23.

[14] J. Perret, *Horace*, trans. by B. Humez (New York 1964) 98.

[15] E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford 1957) 256. Similar are the views of H. J. Rose, "Horace, Od. I XXXIV–XXXV," *CR* 30 (1916) 192–93, B. L. Ullman, "Horace and the Philologians," *CJ* 31 (1936) 412, and R. G. M. Nisbet and M. Hubbard, *Horace: Odes, Book 1* (Oxford 1970). The latter (page 378) are sensitive to the poem's fluctuations of tone: "In the first part Horace provides ironic self-mockery, slightly in the manner of the Lalage ode; in the last stanza he reveals his serious conviction that success in life is to be ascribed not merely to sagacity or virtue, but to the roll of a ball or the turn of a wheel."

[16] V. Poschl, "Horaz und die Politik," *S. B. Akad. Heidelberg* (1956) 16 f. See also "Die Einheit der ersten Römerode," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 340 f.

and political world on the other hand. The thunder portent represents Horace's recognition of "die furchtbare Macht der Gottheit und die Ohnmacht des Menschen." The power of Jupiter-Fortuna manifests itself especially in civil war. Reckford (in the article cited earlier) takes the position that the ode marks Horace's embarkation upon a spiritual journey and his entrance into a state of "holy insecurity."

H. P. Syndikus[17] has recently made the important suggestion that the change which Horace speaks of in 1.34 is a literary one. Syndikus regards the poem as an ironic palinode, akin in literary type to *Epode* 17 and *C.* 1.16. He cites *C.* 1.14 and 1.16 as other poems in which literary changes are announced. Syndikus is no more inclined to read 1.34 as a statement of a major change from a state of foolish wisdom to a state of true knowledge than he is to read *Epis.* 1.1 as definitive rejection on Horace's part of his earlier lyric work. I agree with Syndikus that Horace's change is a literary one, in the sense that in the poem Horace assumes a literary posture. I agree, too, that a change in literary viewpoint is not to be confused with a change in personal (religious, philosophical) outlook. While Syndikus raises the subject of literary change in the sense of change of literary topic or genre, he does not pursue its formal aspects. I believe that in 1.34 Horace announces a change in poetic subject matter (and, given the strictures of ancient literature, perhaps a change affecting genre as well); I shall demonstrate below the formal similarities among those passages (among them, *Epis.* 1.1. ff.) in which Horace announces a literary change in this sense.

In the interpretation of 1.34 to be presented in the following pages, I shall take my cue from Dr. Johnson, who, in response to a suggestion that *Parcus deorum cultor* marks Horace's return to religion, is said to have replied, "Sir, he was not in earnest: this was merely poetical."[18] Whatever Dr. Johnson may have meant by this tantalizing statement, I shall argue that the change which Horace claims to have undergone is poetic, not religious or philosophical. The change itself is announced through a metaphor of a nautical poetic voyage (*retrorsum / vela dare*

[17] H. P. Syndikus, *Die Lyrik des Horaz*, Band I (Darmstadt 1972) 298–310. See especially pages 305–308.

[18] J. Boswell, *Life of Johnson* (Oxford 1961) 1231. Dr. Johnson is quoted by Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, 254 note 4.

atque iterare cursus / cogor relictos [3–5]). Horace declares that he has been compelled by Diespiter to abandon a poetic voyage. The poet's characterization of himself (line 1) and his recent activity (*insanientis dum sapientiae / consultus erro* [2–3]) involve a transference of religious and philosophical terms to the realm of poetry. In the extended description of Jupiter's chariot in the *namque* passage (9–12) and the quasi-philosophic reflections with which the poem concludes (12–16), Horace obliquely offers reasons for the change of poetic course. In the *Fortuna* statement (14–16) he indirectly hints at what the abandoned poem would have been about.

The analogue for Horace's use of sailing language in 1.34 is the closing lyric of Book Four:[19]

> Phoebus volentem proelia me loqui
> victas et urbis increpuit lyra,
> ne parva Tyrrhenum per aequor
> vela darem. (1–4)

The poet is about to undertake a sea voyage, symbolizing, through a Callimachean image, *proelia . . . / victas et urbis*, but is prevented from doing so by Apollo. In both 1.34 and the 4.15 passage, the poet, speaking in the first person, portrays himself as a sailor. In 1.34 the sailing trip is imagined as already begun; in 4.15 it is about to begin. In both passages the poet-sailor halts his voyage because of divine intervention: Apollo *increpuit lyra* in 4.15, Diespiter gave a portentous sign in 1.34.

We note, however, that in 1.34, unlike 4.15, Horace speaks of sailing back:

> nunc retrorsum
> vela dare atque iterare cursus
> cogor relictos . . .

None of the other instances in which I believe Horace uses the nautical voyage metaphor provides a clear parallel.[20]

[19] H. Schütz (Berlin 1889[3]), Müller, Kiessling-Heinze, and Nisbet-Hubbard mention the 4.15 passage in their commentaries. Müller was the first to express a dichotomy often felt but seldom articulated in interpretations of the sailing image: "vela dare: hier von der Philosophie, wie IV.15.3 f. von der Poesie."

[20] *C.* 1.14.1 ff. is a likely exception to this statement. The instances are *C.* 1.3, 1.14, 3.2.25–32, 3.29.57–64, 4.15.1 ff., and perhaps 1.26.1–3. The reader will probably view the items on this list—with the exception of the 4.15 passage—with some skepticism. To argue my position lies beyond the scope of the present essay.

Iterare cursus . . . relictos has received far more attention from scholars than the sailing image which precedes it. Kiessling-Heinze comment:

> um die Fahrtrichtung, von der er abgekommen war, wieder aufzunehmen; also zum Glauben seiner Jugend zurückzukehren.

Wickham translates: "to steer again in the course I had deserted." Shorey and Laing, citing 1.7.32 and 2.19.12, translate *iterare*, "I take once more to." On *relictos*, they comment:

> the forsaken course is the naive faith of childhood. Bentley's *relectos*, "retraced," is idiomatically cumulative with "iterare." Horace perhaps could not have told us himself whether he meant simply "turn back," or more specifically "sail back to the point where I started on the wrong track and then enter on the right."

Richard Bentley found *iterare cursus relictos* to be unacceptable Latin and accepted Heinsius' emendation, *relectos*. His objection:

> Iterare relicta maria, vestigia, vias, spatia, recte quidem dixeris: *cursus* autem cum non ipsa via est, sed per viam decursio: non dixeris cursus relictos, sed intermissos . . .[21]

Nisbet-Hubbard argue for *relectos* in their recent commentary. Reckford concurs with Bentley on *cursus*:

> Exactly: *cursus* means, not a set path, but the act of traveling over the sea.

Reckford also points out that *cursus* is usually translated as a singular, the equivalent of *iter*. Kiessling-Heinze, for example, call it a poetic plural. Reckford believes that *Vela dare atque iterare cursus relictos* (he omits *retrorsum*)

> means not to sail backwards along an earlier course that had been abandoned, but to give sail and (the ideas should be taken together) to set sail again on the sea.

He ignores Bentley's objection to *relictos*, and his translation omits any reference to either *relictos* or *retrorsum*.[22]

If, as I am suggesting, Horace is abandoning a poetic voyage when he says *retrorsum vela dare . . .*, then *iterare cursus . . . relictos*, connected

[21] *Quintus Horatius Flaccus*, ex recensione et cum notis atque emendationibus Richardi Bentleii (Berlin 1869[3]).

[22] Reckford (above, note 11) 504 and note 7.

with *retrorsum*, etc., by *atque* and dependent upon the same verb, *cogor*, must also be part of the poetic voyage metaphor.

Cursus, singular or plural, does not occur in any other passage in which Horace uses the way of song metaphor. Other poets who use the metaphor furnish examples of *cursus* in the singular:

Da facilem cursum, atque aud acibus adnue coeptis. (Vergil, *Georgics* 1.40)

Contigimus portus, quo mihi cursus erat. (Ovid. *Rem. Am.* 812)

To seek an analogue for *iterare cursus cogor relictos*, we turn now to those passages in which Horace explicitly speaks of going back to an abandoned subject or genre, either by stopping or by changing his poetic course. We look first at a passage in the *Odes* which is widely recognized as a stopping device, 2.1.37–40:

sed ne relictis, Musa procax, iocis
Ceae retractes munera neniae,
mecum Dionaeo sub antro
quaere modos leviore plectro.

When Horace finds himself writing about the subject of civil war, the very subject which Asinius Pollio was bold enough to treat (*tractas* 6), he scolds his Muse for abandoning *ioci* (note *relicti*) and writing once again (*retractes*) dirges such as Simonides wrote. Horace and his Muse should devote themselves (*quaere*) to love poetry. In the 1.34 passage, however, Horace is compelled to alter, not to end, his poetic course.

Ernst-Richard Schwinge suggested, as did Fraenkel, that the ending of Horace *C.* 2.1 should be compared with Pindar *Nem.* 3.26 f. Schwinge adds *Nem.* 4.33–35 and 69–72 and *Nem.* 5.14–18.[23] In the first and third of these passages Pindar uses the image of the poetic voyage to effect a change in his poetic course (*Nem.* 4.33–35 and *Nem.* 5.14–18 are stopping devices, but not instances of the sailing metaphor):

θυμέ, τίνα πρὸς ἀλλοδαπάν
ἄκραν ἐμὸν πλόον παραμείβεαι, (*Nem.* 3.26 f.)

In the previous lines (19–25) Pindar has asserted that the victor has sailed to the farthest limits of human achievement, represented by the

[23] E.-R. Schwinge, "Zur Kunsttheorie des Horaz," *Philologus* 107 (1963) 76, note 2. Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, 239.

Pillars of Hercules. Maintaining the sailing image, Pindar then turns his own boat, the boat of song, away from the victor and toward "another land," i.e., another theme, an ancient one, a story about the house of Aeacus.

The *Nemean* 4 passage is even closer to our 1.34 passage, for Pindar explicitly speaks of turning back his boat of song to another theme:

> *Γαδείρων τὸ πρὸς ζόφον οὐ περατόν· ἀπότρεπε*
> *αὖτις Εὐρώπαν ποτὶ χέρσον ἔντεα ναός.*
> *ἄπορα γὰρ λόγον Αἰακοῦ*
> *παίδων τὸν ἅπαντά μοι διελθεῖν.* (69–72)

Pindar wishes to cut short the story of the Aeacidae, claiming that it is too long to be told in full, and turns his sails back again to Europe, the Theandridae (73 ff.), and the present victor, Timasarchus (78), whom he has already named at the beginning of the poem in lines 9–11.

Horace does not, like Pindar, effect a change in theme in mid-poem, but he does use similar language to describe a renewed undertaking at the beginning of a poem. In *C.* 1.19.1–4, Venus, Bacchus, and Licentia compel Horace to return to love and love song:

> Mater saeva Cupidinum
> Thebanaeque iubet me Semelae puer
> et lasciva Licentia
> finitis animum reddere amoribus.

Horace acts under Venus' orders (*iubet*). He must go back to something which he thought he had completed. This compulsion prevents him from speaking of foreign affairs, which represent grander themes for grander poetry:

> in me tota ruens Venus
> Cyprum deseruit, nec patitur Scythas
> et versis animosum equis
> Parthum dicere nec quae nihil attinent. (9–12)

In *C.* 4.1 Venus again, despite the poet's protestations, forces him back to love, an event which Horace speaks of as a renewal of the wars of love:

> Intermissa, Venus diu
> rursus bella moves? parce precor, precor. (1–2)

Horace again speaks of being compelled to go back (*rursus*) to something. *Intermissa . . . diu . . . bella* are analogous to the *amoribus* which were *finitis* in 1.19. Horace had abandoned the writing of love lyric for some time, but now portrays himself as compelled to return to it. The return is not only a return to love song, but a return to lyric poetry as well.

Finally, in *Epis.* 1.1, Horace, assuming the posture of a retired gladiator, tells Maecenas, who is said to have been asking for more lyrics, that he no longer wants to play the old game:

> Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena,
> spectatum satis et donatum iam rude quaeris,
> Maecenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo.
> non eadem est aetas, non mens. Veianius armis
> Herculis ad postem fixis latet abditus agro,
> ne populum extrema totiens exoret harena. (1–6)

Horace refuses to return again (note *iterum*) to the writing of lyric.

Let us consider the verbal parallels between the 1.34 passage and those which we have just examined. *Retrorsum vela dare* is parallel to *animum reddere* (1.19), *rursus bella moves* (4.1), and *iterum includere* (*Epis.* 1.1; cf. *iterare C.* 1.34). *Cursus . . . relictos* in 1.34 is parallel to *relictis iocis* (2.1), *finitis amoribus* (1.19), *intermissa diu bella* (4.1), and *antiquo ludo* (*Epis.* 1.1).

Let us summarize the passages which we have just examined. In 2.1 Horace tells the Muse to seek poetic measures *leviore plectro.* Horace has earlier characterized himself as *levis* and *tenuis,* most notably in 1.6.20 and 9. In telling the Muse to seek poetry *leviore plectro,* he is, in effect, sending her back to a kind of poetry with which she has been associated in the past. In the above passages Horace speaks of going back either to love lyric (2.1, 1.19) or to lyric as a genre (*Epis.* 1.1). *Antiquus ludus* in *Epis.* 1.1 implies both lyric and "light" lyric. *C.* 4.1 represents a return to both love lyric and to lyric as a genre.

In 1.34, I suggest, Horace has sailed into forbidden poetic territory. He finds himself, perhaps, on the high sea, representing, as in 4.15, grander themes, and is forced to retreat. Horace has written about love, most recently in the preceding poem, 1.33. He was contem-

plating a poem on another, presumably grander theme, but the thunder portent forces him back to light poetry, which he had temporarily abandoned. The *relicti cursus* of 1.34, then, are probably abandoned paths of song, songs of love and wine, themes appropriate to the *tenuis poeta*.[24]

We turn now to *cogor*, line 5, which expresses a kind of literary compulsion. Horace's poetic course is affected by divinities on numerous occasions, who force him either to stop or to undertake a particular task. The reader will recall that Apollo checks the poet's undertaking at the beginning of 4.15, as he also checked Callimachus' (*Aitia* fr. 1.21 ff.), Vergil's (*Ecl.* 6.3–8), and Propertius' (3.3.13–24, 4.1.133–38) courses.

The verbs *veto*, *iubeo*, *cogo*, and the like are common in expressions of literary compulsion. In *Serm.* 1.10, Quirinus, a native Roman divinity, forbids Horace to write poetry in Greek:

> atque ego cum Graecos facerem, natus mare citra,
> versiculos, vetuit me tali voce Quirinus,
> post mediam noctem visus cum somnia vera,
> "in silvam non ligna feras insanius ac si
> magnas Graecorum malis implere catervas." (31–35)

Similarly, the Muse forbids Horace to sing Caesar's and Agrippa's praises in *C.* 1.6:

> tenues grandia, dum pudor
> imbellisque lyrae Musa potens *vetat*
> laudes egregii Caesaris et tuas
> culpa deterere ingeni. (9–12)

In 1.19, as we saw above, Venus orders (*iubet*) Horace back to love lyric.[25] *Cogo* occurs in two passages in which the compulsion comes

> at tua, Maecenas, vitae praecepta recepi,
> cogor et exemplis te superare tuis.

[24] The term commonly applied to the kind of poetic posture which Horace assumes here is *recusatio*. I find Horace's devices of refusal too varied profitably to be placed into a single category. For treatment of Horatian *recusatio* in twentieth century scholarship, see R. Reitzenstein, "Horaz und die hellenistische Lyrik," *NJA* 21 (1908) 84; Shorey and Laing's introduction to *C.* 1.6; Fraenkel (above, note 17) 219 ff., 233 f., 397 f., 434 f.; and Schwinge (above, note 23) 82 note 2 and 91 note 1. S. Commager (*The Odes of Horace* [New Haven 1962] 112) also has reservations about the term.

[25] Commenting on the *Serm.* 1.3 and *Epis.* 2.1 passages, C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* (Cambridge 1963) 191, note 3, remarks, "*cogo* was apparently the *mot juste* for official

from another man-god, Caesar:

> Omnibus hoc vitium est cantoribus, inter amicos
> ut numquam inducant animum cantare rogati,
> *iniussi* numquam desistant. Sardus habebat
> ille Tigellius hoc. Caesar, qui *cogere* posset,
> si peteret per amicitiam patris atque suam non
> quicquam proficeret . . . (*Serm.* 1.3.1–6)

> cum speramus eo rem venturam ut, simul atque
> carmina rescieris nos fingere, commodus ultro
> arcessas *et egere vetes et scribere cogas.* (*Epis.* 2.1.226–29)[26]

Throughout classical literature poets received aid from gods who initiated, guided the course of, and ended their verse. Often, such aid is requested by a poet, who feels or claims to feel that his own powers are not adequate for his task.[27] Compulsion, however, relieves the poet of responsibility for whatever he is or is not doing, since all responsibility is transferred from the poet to a god. No reader can possibly object if a poet refuses to write a certain kind of poem, refuses to write about certain subjects, or concludes a poem because he is forced to do so by a divine power. In the case of 1.34, Jupiter's thundering in a clear sky leaves the poet no choice other than to turn the boat of song around and go back, probably, to the old themes of the *tenuis poeta.* Why Horace should wish to be relieved of responsibility for his action does not become fully apparent until the final sentence of the poem.

We turn now to *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens.* As generally interpreted, the phrase means that Horace was negligent of religious observances, indifferent towards the gods.[28] This interpretation

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encouragement." Propertius (3.9.21 f.) experiences a different kind of poetic compulsion:

[26] *Iubeo* also occurs at *A.P.* 438, where the compelling divinity is a man-god, the honored critic, Quintilius Varus.

[27] For poetic *aporia,* see O. Becker, *Das Bild des Weges* (Berlin 1937) 2, 77, 120 ff. and *passim.*

[28] Most commentators have concentrated upon distinguishing between the meanings of the two adjectives, *parcus* and *infrequens.* Acro's brief note is "minus colens." Cruquius uses the same phrase in his gloss on *parcus,* which he also explains as "tardus, non hilarus, sed odiosus cessator." *Infrequens* means "non assuetus." Doering's paraphrase of the first line of the poem is "qui raro deos colit, nec eorum templa frequentabat," and the comments of Shorey and Laing, Wickham, and Kiessling-Heinze are substantially the same.

presupposes that the phrase is to be construed with the *dum* clause: Horace's past error (*dum . . . erro*) consisted in neglecting the gods; now (*nunc* 3), because of the thunder portent, he must undergo a change of heart. The position of the phrase, however, suggests that it ought to be taken *apo koinou* with both the *dum* clause and with the main verb, *cogor*.

Deorum cultor belongs among those expressions which Horace frequently uses to describe his relations as poet to the gods.[29] If an actual worshipper of the gods may be said to be stingy in his offerings and to go to the altars of the gods but infrequently, what of the metaphorical *cultor*? The two adjectives *parcus* and *infrequens* have a limiting or negative force. *Parcus* is the equivalent, one would imagine, of "not generous." But Horace does not mean to suggest stinginess. Rather, he pictures himself, here as elsewhere, as one who makes small offerings, in the role of humble sacrificer, as, for example, in *C.* 2.17.30–32:

> reddere victimas
> aedemque votivam memento:
> nos humilem feriemus agnam.

Greater offerings befit the greater man, Maecenas; a small offering is fitting for Horace.[30] Greater offerings (more than one sacrificial animal and a temple built as an expression of thanks for his recovery) befit the greater man, Maecenas; a small offering, a single lowly lamb, is fitting for Horace.

Horace appears in the role of humble sacrificer in 4.2.53–60 also:

> te decem tauri totidemque vaccae,
> me tener solvet vitulus, relicta
> matre qui largis iuvenescit herbis
> in mea vota,

[29] Horace may have been the first Roman writer to use *deorum cultor* in a metaphorical sense, with reference to himself as poet. The earliest occurrence of the phrase in Latin literature is Cicero, *Tusc.* 1.69, where it is qualified by a *quasi: quasi contemplatorem caeli ac deorum cultorem*. See *ThLL* v. 4, col. 1319, s.v. *cultor* II. For later metaphorical uses of the phrase, cf. Ovid, *Tris.* 2.13–14 and 5.3.34.

[30] The posture of the humble sacrificer may have been suggested to Horace by Callimachus, *Aitia*, fr. 1, 21 ff.; cf. also line 32 (*οὐλαχύς, ὁ πτερόεις*) and L. P. Wilkinson (above, note 10) 119 f.

fronte curvatos imitatus ignis
tertium lunae referentis ortum,
qua notam duxit, niveus videri,
cetera fulvus.

The greater sacrifice will be performed by Iullus Antonius, *maiore poeta plectro* 33, who is to write an epic about a greater subject, Caesar. Horace, the *apis parvus*, declines to undertake the formidable task of writing an encomium on the Princeps. The small sacrifice which he will offer for the triumphant homecoming of Caesar represents his small poetic offering. Antonius will make a larger offering, representing his larger poem.

Horace's small offerings symbolize his *paupertas* and his small poems. Smallness is a value common both to Horace's *modus vivendi* and to his literary preferences.[31] In 1.34 Horace is abandoning a poetic voyage and returning to songs of wine and love. With *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens* he announces that he is a writer of small poems. That is, when Horace assumes the posture of humble sacrificer, he regards himself as unsuited to write anything other than small poems.

We turn next to the *dum* clause:

insanientis dum sapientiae
consultus erro . . . (2 f.)

This clause is remarkable in that four of its five words provide two instances of oxymoron. The first of these, *insanientis . . . sapientiae*, is dependent upon the participle *consultus*. *Insaniens*[32] is grammatically subordinate, and therefore subordinate in sense to *sapientia*. The analogues for Horace's use of *erro*, *sapientia*, and *insania* (*insaniens*) in 1.34 are derived mainly from programmatic passages in his non-lyric works. All are common terms in the vocabulary of poetics. Let us examine first the notion of *error*:

scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim,
hic error tamen et levis haec insania quantas
virtutes habeat sic collige . . . (*Epis.* 2.1.117–19)

[31] See H. J. Mette, "'genus tenue' und 'mensa tenuis' bei Horaz," *MH* 18 (1961) 136–39, and Schwinge (above, note 23).

[32] The only other occurrence of the verbal adjective in Horace is *C.* 3.4.30:

utcumque mecum vos eritis, libens
insanientem navita Bosphorum
temptabo . . .

To sail the raging Bosporus probably represents a dangerous poetic voyage which Horace will be able to undertake only because the Muses will travel with him.

In the lines immediately preceding, Horace has protested that those who practice other *technai* do so only after training in their specific spheres of competence. But everybody, skilled and unskilled, writes poetry. Nevertheless, this occupation (ironically characterized in minimizing terms, *hic error . . . et levis haec insania*) has its merits. What follows (lines 119–38) is a defense of the role of the poet in society. The poet is free from *avaritia*. He serves as moral educator of the citizens, particularly the young, and as intermediary between the state and the gods. In this passage *error et insania* initially refer to the aesthetic madness of scribbling by skilled and unskilled, but the minimizing terms are subverted by the defense which follows.

In *Epis.* 2.2.126–40 Horace's professed preference for an inability to see his own literary faults is the counterpart of the hallucination of the man from Argos, who, after coming to his senses, refers to his lost state as a *gratissimus error* (140):

> praetulerim scriptor delirus inersque videri,
> dum mea delectent mala me vel denique fallant,
> quam sapere et ringi. fuit haud ignobilis Argis,
> qui se credebat miros audire tragoedos,
> in vacuo laetus sessor plausorque theatro;
> cetera qui vitae servaret munia recto
> more, bonus sane vicinus, amabilis hospes,
> comis in uxorem, posset qui ignoscere servis
> et signo laeso non insanire lagoenae,
> posset qui rupem et puteum vitare patentem.
> hic ubi cognatorum opibus curisque refectus
> expulit elleboro morbum bilemque meraco,
> et redit ad sese, "pol me occidistis, amici,
> non servastis" ait, "cui sic extorta voluptas
> et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error."

This posture serves as a transitional device between Horace's description of the ideal poet (109–25) and his rejection of lyric (*nugae*) in favor of philosophy (*sapientia* 141–44). Apparent despair at attaining the high standards of poetic excellence which he has just described produces an ironic preference for deluded self-satisfaction over a correct critical estimate (*sapere*) of his faults. This alternative is not acceptable—here, or elsewhere in Horace—however. Horace claims in effect, that if he should lack critical *sapientia*, he had best put aside lyric and turn to philosophic *sapientia*.

In *A.P.* 453 ff. there is a play upon the literal and figurative meanings of *erro*:

> ut mala quem scabies aut morbus regius urget
> aut fanaticus error et iracunda Diana,
> vesanum tetigisse timent fugiuntque poetam
> qui sapiunt: agitant pueri incautique sequuntur.
> hic, dum sublimis versus ructatur et errat,
> si veluti merulis intentus decidit auceps
> in puteum foveamve, licet "succurrite" longum
> clamet "io cives!" non sit qui tollere curet.
> si curet quis opem ferre et demittere funem,
> "qui scis an prudens huc se deiecerit atque
> servari nolit?"

The *poeta vesanus* is compared with people suffering from other kinds of madness, among them *fanaticus error* (454)—the wild dancing of the "inspired" beggar-priests of Bellona. If he should fall into a pit while belching verses and wandering along (*errat* 457), no one would rescue him: he is probably only trying to win immortality in the manner of Empedocles. *Qui sapiunt* (456) are said to avoid the *poeta vesanus*. The wise are those 1) who are willing to submit to the judgment of a sound critic like Quintilius Varus (438 ff.), 2) who are willing to submit to the *labor* of literary effort (445 ff.), and 3) whose good sense permits them to see the folly of valuing fame won in any manner.[33]

In 1.34 as in the above passages, *error* is used in the sense of literary fault or mistake. Horace evidently considers himself to have been guilty of a literary error in the past. The most obvious mistake for him to have made, was to have undertaken the poetic voyage which he is now forced to abandon.

Sapientia with reference to poetry occurs in four programmatic passages in the *Second Literary Epistle* and the *Ars Poetica*. They are *Epis.* 2.2.126–40, *A.P.* 454-end, 309–18, and 391–407. We have seen

[33] See also *Epis.* 2.1.63–65 (the *vulgus* makes a mistake in literary judgment when its extravagant admiration for ancient poets leads it to reject all modern ones), and *A.P.* 308, where literary *error* is opposed to literary *virtus*. *Error* (= an aesthetic fault, a lack of literary judgment) is synonymous with *insania* (*Epis.* 2.1.118 discussed above, *Serm.* 2.3.305), *stultitia* (*Epis.* 2.1.260, *A.P.* 272), and *vitium* (*Serm.* 1.4.9). *Serm.* 2.3, a veritable compendium of antonyms and synonyms of Latin words for madness, as well as a catalogue of the varieties of madness, culminates with a charge of poetic madness levelled against Horace (305–27).

above in discussions of the first two of these passages that *sapientia* is the opposite of *error* or *insania*, lack of critical judgment, literary mistake. *Sapientia* in the sense of good critical judgment is the human side of poetic endeavor. It is dependent upon *ars* and *labor*.

We turn next to the third programmatic passage, *A.P.* 309–18:

> scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons:
> rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae,
> verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.
> qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis,
> quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes,
> quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae
> partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto
> reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.
> respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo
> doctum imitatorem et vivas hinc ducere voces.

Sapientia is the beginning of and basis for good writing. Its origin lies in the study of the Platonic dialogues. He who studies the content (*res* 310 and 311) of the Platonic dialogues and he whose moral perceptions of the nature of love and duty are correct will be able to write well. In this passage Horace plays down the form and emphasizes the content of good writing.

In legendary times, however, before the advent of philosophy, the poets Orpheus and Amphion learned wisdom from the gods (Orpheus is *sacer interpresque deorum*), and they were teachers of *sapientia* to the unenlightened. In *A.P.* 391–401, the last programmatic passage in which *sapientia* is mentioned, Orpheus and Amphion are considered to have been a civilizing force in early society. They helped to establish a code of social ethics for primitive men. As civilizers they have affinities with Mercury (*C.* 1.10, 3.11) and Bacchus (*C.* 2.19). As teachers and moralists, they have affinities with Horace in his role of *vates*:

> silvestris homines sacer interpresque deorum
> caedibus et victu foedo deterruit Orpheus,
> dictus ob hoc lenire tigris rabidosque leones;
> dictus et Amphion, Thebanae conditor urbis,
> saxa movere sono testudinis et prece blanda
> ducere quo vellet. fuit haec sapientia quondam,

publica privatis secernere, sacra profanis,
concubitu prohibere vago, dare iura maritis,
oppida moliri, leges incidere ligno.
sic honor et nomen divinis vatibus atque 400
carminibus venit.

The question of the origin of *sapientia* is the crucial one in determining which kind of *sapientia* Horace is talking about in *C.* 1.34. I suggested above that line 1 is ambiguous and ought to be construed both with the main verb and with the *dum* clause. Its meaning when construed with the main verb has already been discussed. What does it mean when construed with the *dum* clause? Here the notions of negligence and indifference often associated with the interpretation of line 1 are relevant. For if Horace as poet has failed to worship the gods sufficiently, then the *insaniens sapientia* of line 2 cannot be of divine origin. It must, then, be of human origin, wisdom gained through human effort: sound critical judgment, which Horace associates with *ars* and *labor.*[34]

Consultus, as several commentators point out, commonly takes a genitive of a specific technical skill, *iuris*, referring to knowledge of the law.[35] Horace couples *consultus* with a genitive of another technical skill, poetic *technê*.

If Horace had written only *sapientiae . . . consultus*, he would have meant that although adept in poetic *sapientia*, he had made a mistake: by relying solely on his own skill and by neglecting the role of the gods in the process of poetic creation, he undertook a wrong poetic course. But what he wrote was *insanientis . . . sapientiae / consultus.* The reader will recall that Horace applied the notion of madness in the sense of lack of critical judgment to poets in *Epis.* 2.2.126, *scriptor delirus inersque*, and in *A.P.* 455, *vesanus poeta.* Horace's past wisdom in 1.34 was mad, foolish, mistaken. He had considered himself an

[34] In Greek literature poetic *sophia* referred to the form and content of song, as well as to the poet's skill. It was frequently regarded as derived from the Muses. For some examples, see Theognis 19 and 769 ff; Solon, fr. 13.52; Pindar, *Olym.* 1.111–16, *Pyth.* 1.12, 6.49, *Isth.* 7.18; Arist. *Frogs* 882; *Anth. Pal.* 11.132. See also *Aitia*, fr. 1.17–18, where Callimachus distinguishes between *sophia* (poetry in general) and *technê* (skill at writing poetry).

[35] So Kiessling-Heinze, Shorey and Laing, and others. Livy 10.22.7 has *iuris atque eloquentiae consultus*; Cicero *Phil.* 9.5.10 *non ille magis iuris consultus quam iustitiae fuit.* Horace has *consultus iuris* at *A.P.* 367.

expert in this specious wisdom. He believed himself to be adept in the exercise of sound critical judgment. Either because he momentarily forgot that it was his nature to be a *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens*, or else because in cultivating *sapientia*, he grew forgetful of the role of divine aid in the process of poetic creation, he attempted a wrong poetic course.[36]

To sum up: *C.* 1.34 begins with a sentence of great complexity. In line 1 Horace assumes the posture of humble sacrificer, *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens*, one whose small offerings symbolize his small poetry. Horace does not often seek divine aid when writing lyric. If he had done so before embarking on the poetic voyage which he was forced to abandon, he perhaps would have been able to write the "other" poem. In the *dum* clause of 2–3, Horace claims that he made a mistake (*erro*). He had been an expert (*consultus*) in poetic *sapientia*, cultivated in literary judgment, but this wisdom turned out to be misguided (*insanientis*). The nature of Horace's error is partly indicated in the predicate of the sentence, *nunc-relictos* 3–5. Here Horace compounds his metaphor, adding to the posture of the humble sacrificer the figure of the poet-sailor. He is forced to give up a poetic voyage which he had begun (*retrorsum vela dare*) and to return to abandoned poetic courses (*iterare cursus relictos*), songs of wine and love, light lyric.

We turn now to lines 5–12, which are a fusion of two seemingly unlikely elements, the description of the thunder portent and the strangely extended description of the powers of Diespiter's chariot:

namque Diespiter,
igni corusco nubila dividens
plerumque, per purum tonantis
egit equos volucremque currum,
quo bruta tellus et vaga flumina,
quo Styx et invisi horrida Taenari
sedes Atlanteusque finis
concutitur.

[36] The closest parallels to Horace's diction (*insanientis dum sapientiae consultus erro*) which I have been able to find are *Anth. Pal.* 9.406:

φεῦ τίνες ὕδωρ
πίνουσιν, μανίην σώφρονα μαινόμενοι,

and Plato, *Rep.* 10.607B, μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι.

The *namque* passage has been regarded by some as the structural center of the poem. Wickham, for example, comments:

> The framework of the Ode bears some resemblance to that of 1.22; each centering round a circumstance in the poet's personal experience. This in both cases stands in the middle of the Ode, introduced by the emphatic *namque* (1.22.9): it is the ground of the statements that precede and follow. What he has witnessed in this case, and the cause to which alone he can trace it justify both the general recantation of stanza 1, and the solution which he gives in stanza 4 of the difficulty in the human world which seems to him analogous to the thunder, for which no "secondary cause" was to be found, in the material world.

E. Fraenkel raises, but does not satisfactorily answer the question of the relation of personal experience to poetic fiction.[37]

Although the thunderbolt is often regarded as punishment sent against the impious by Jupiter, thunder and lightning from a clear sky were also considered as a special portent, indicating divine will. Cicero in *De Divinatione* 2.44–45 denies that Jupiter warns men what they should or should not do, and commends to his reader the scientific explanations of these phenomena propounded by the Stoics. Seneca (*Quaes. Nat.*, Book 2 *passim*) offers scientific explanations for thunder and lightning, as did Cicero and Lucretius. Among the poets, however, thunder in a clear sky (or thunder and lightning) was sometimes considered favorable, sometimes unfavorable.[38]

Since in 1.34 the thunder has caused Horace to stop what he was doing, to give up the nautical voyage, it could not have been a sign of favor. If Diespiter had approved of what Horace was doing he would not have stopped him. But as it is, he apparently did not want

[37] Fraenkel (above, note 15) 256 f. A. D. Leeman, "Some Comments on Fraenkel's Horace," *Mnemosyne*, Ser. 4, 11 (1958) 248, takes Fraenkel to task: The tone of the poem is "highly serious;" the *namque* passage definitely does not introduce a *paradeigma*: it gives "the sole and direct cause of a sudden spiritual change in the poet." E. Zinn, "APOROS SOTERIA: Horaz im Rettungsboot (*carm.* III.29.62)," in *Eranion: Festschrift für H. Hommel* (Tubingen 1961) 204 note 37, is disinclined to believe that the *adunata* described in 1.22 and 1.34 are totally divorced from personal experience. I believe that the flight of the wolf in 1.22 is derived from the Greek proverb, λύκον ἰδεῖν, to be struck dumb. I argue for this view and offer an interpretation of 1.22 in a forthcoming essay, "Horace, *C.* 1.22: Poetic and Political Integrity."

[38] Examples of the former are Homer, *Od.* 20.112–14, Vergil, *Aen.* 7.141, 8.528 f., 9.360, and Ovid, *Fasti* 3.369; examples of the latter are Vergil, *Geor.* 1.487, Suetonius, *Titus* 10, and Lucan 1.530.

Horace to continue writing the other poem upon which he had embarked.

Horace contrasts Jupiter's act in the present case, driving his thundering horses and winged chariot across a clear sky, with what he does as a general rule: he parts the clouds with ruddy fire.[39] There are three contrasts involved in our passage: (1) clouds vs. clear sky; (2) *fulmen* vs. thunder; (3) general practice vs. particular occasion. It has been Jupiter's "general" practice to hurl the thunderbolt thus far in Book 1, in 1.2.1–4, 1.3.38–40, and 1.12.59–60. In 1.2 the immediate targets for Jupiter's thunderbolt are the *sacrae . . . arces* of Rome, which have become the object of Jupiter's ire through the *scelus* (29) of civil war. In the case of the 1.3 and 1.12 passages, I suggest, the targets of the *fulmen* are also *impii*, but specifically those potentially guilty of poetic *impietas*:

> nil mortalibus ardui est:
> caelum ipsum petimus stultitia neque
> per nostrum patimur scelus
> iracunda Iovem ponere fulmina. (1.3.37–40)

As I read *Sic te diva*, Horace is reflecting upon Vergil's embarkation upon the *Aeneid*. Sailing the great sea of epic is dangerous and, judged by Callimachean literary criteria, forbidden. The *nos* of the above lines are Vergil and Horace. "Seeking the sky" refers to attempting to win immortality. In the catalogue which precedes these lines Horace has presented three exempla which suggest alternative possible outcomes for Vergil's endeavor. The last of these, Hercules, escaped the bonds of death through his *labor* (*perrupit Acheronta Herculeus labor* 36). Vergil aspires to win immortality through a poetic *stultitia* and *scelus*: Horace in suggesting that he might actually succeed and that he might himself win immortality through a lyric which expresses such a daring assertion is also implicated. Both poets, impious in their respective ways, rouse Jupiter's ire and become targets for his *fulmina*.[40]

[39] So Lambinus, Cruquius, J. C. Orelli–J. G. Baiter–W. Hirschfelder (Berlin 1882), O. Keller–A. Holder (Leipzig 1889), and Kiessling–Heinze. Porphyrio believed that Horace was contrasting thunder in cloudy weather with thunder in clear weather.

[40] P. Lockyer, "Horace's Propempticon and Vergil's Voyage," *CW* 61 (1967) 42–45, interprets *C.* 1.3 as referring to Vergil's embarkation upon the *Aeneid*. See also my forthcoming article, "Vergil, Horace, and the Sea of Epic (*C.* 1.3)."

In the 1.12 passage also, reference to Jupiter's *fulmina* ends the poem:

> tu parum castis inimica mittes
> fulmina lucis.

Horace has crowned a long list of gods, heroes, and illustrious Romans with Caesar. He predicts that in future Jove will rule (*regnes* 52) and Caesar will rule (*reget* 57) after (and provided that?) he has subjected Rome's foreign enemies (*egerit* 54). In future Jove will shake Olympus with his chariot (*quaties* 58) as he always does, but recollection of Jove's power to send the thunderbolt against the impious deflects Horace from saying anything more about the perpetuity of Caesar's power. The *parum castis lucis* are poetic groves, as in *C.* 3.4.6 f. (*videor pios / errare per lucos*).[41] Jupiter's *fulmina* in these two poems serve as a stopping device for the *pius poeta.*

Returning now to 1.34, we recall that Horace refers to Jupiter's *fulmen*, but what actually stops Horace's poetic course is thunder in a clear sky. This portent is a natural *adunaton*, a reminder that for a god, nothing is impossible. In the opening statement of the poem Horace has called attention to a limitation of his human, poetic power. Since thunder often precedes the thunderbolt (Lucretius 6.406–09). Horace may be viewing the portent as a preliminary warning, a sign of the *fulmen* which was to come if he persisted in writing the other poem.

We may be surprised to find Jupiter (Diespiter) in the role more commonly assumed by Apollo (recall 4.15), that of intervening deity. I account for his presence in 1.34 and 1.12 on the grounds that in these poems Horace touches upon contemporary political history.[42] Jupiter, special protector (1.12) and adviser (3.4, 3.25) of Caesar, is traditionally responsible for the political and social welfare of nations. The archaic name Diespiter enhances the solemnity of the poetic sanction under which Horace labors.

[41] It is possible that the groves are also meant to be public religious precincts, which become the target of the thunderbolt because of the impiety or negligence of the Roman citizens. In this case Horace issues an oblique warning to Caesar and the Roman citizens (as at the ends of 1.2 and 1.35): you, Caesar, engage in foreign wars (53–56), but let all beware civil war, which offends the gods.

[42] The same holds for 3.2.29, the only other passage in which Diespiter appears. 1.3.38–40 is more difficult to explain. As Commager points out (above, note 24) 119, the imagery suggests the battle of the gods and the giants.

Thunder, the big sound, stood for the grand style. Callimachus provides a poetic antecedent. In the programmatic introduction to the *Aitia*, Callimachus rejects a miscellaneous assortment of big things: the long continuous epic (ἔν ἄεισμα διηνεκές 3), poems about kings and heroes, the Persian land measure, and the big sound of Zeus' thunder:

μηδ' ἀπ' ἐμεῦ διφᾶτε μέγα ψοφέουσαν ἀοιδήν
τίκτεσθαι· βροντᾶν οὐκ ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ Διός.[43]

Callimachus did not wish to make a loud noise, and this disinclination stopped him from writing one kind of poetry. Recall the end of the *Crito* where a *bombos* stops Socrates from hearing and speaking, renders Crito unable to speak, and thus ends the dialogue.

We turn now to lines 9–12, the description of Diespiter's *currus*:

(egit equos volucremque currum,)
quo bruta tellus et vaga flumina,
quo Styx invisi horrida Taenari
sedes Atlanteusque finis
concutitur. (valet ima summis . . .)

These 3½ lines have received relatively little attention from scholars, despite the fact that the description occupies almost a quarter of the sixteen-line poem. Jupiter's chariot shakes or causes to tremble (*concutitur*) land and water, generically expressed by *bruta tellus et vaga flumina*. The *currus* also shakes a river in the underworld, the Styx; the cave through which one enters the underworld from earth (*invisi-sedes*); and the boundary between earth and sky, set by the Atlas Mountains (*Atlanteusque finis*).[44]

The notion of boundary does not become explicit until *Atlanteusque finis*, but is implicit in the entire description. In the first *quo* clause, the land-water doublet describes the natural division between the two parts of the earth. In the second *quo* clause, Horace presents a vertical

[43] W. Wimmel (*Kallimachos im Rom* [Wiesbaden 1960] 101) in his remarks on these lines suggests that the rejection of the big noise and the rejection of the big sea are related devices of refusal. Wimmel does not discuss the significance of either thunder or the sea in Horace. For thunder referring to a loud literary noise, see also Propertius 3.17.40 and 4.1.132 f., Ovid, *Tris.* 4.10.17 ff., and Cicero, *Orator* 29 and *Ad Att.* 15.1.

[44] Horace has deflected praise of Jupiter's powers to his chariot, described by two relative clauses introduced by *quo* (9) . . . *quo* (10). Both the relative clause, usually modifying the god, and the anaphora are characteristic features of hymnal style.

cross-section of the divisions of the universe. Beginning in the underworld with the Styx, he moves to Taenarum, which marks the division between the underworld and the earth, and goes from there to the Atlas Mountains, which mark the division between earth and sky. Divine power is not subject to spatial limits. It is, furthermore, not subject to limits of time. But Horace is not merely calling attention to the fact that Jupiter, being a god, is immortal. In the vertical description of the universe, Horace emphasizes the underworld. First, the Styx. Then, *invisi horrida Taenari / sedes*. The two adjectives *invisi* and *horrida* remind the reader that death is hateful; *sedes*, a place where one stays, reminds him that death is permanent. Man is confined first to earth, ultimately to the underworld. He cannot cross the set bounds of time and space.

In describing the ability of Jupiter's *currus* to cause all divisions of the universe to tremble, Horace further defines the nature and extent of divine power. Jupiter may manifest his power by reaching across all natural divisions of the universe and by causing them to tremble. *Concutio* is often used of action caused by thunder or a thunderbolt. It is often used also to describe a reaction of fear, usually with *metu*. I have found no example, however, of the underworld being shaken by thunder or the blow of a thunderbolt, though the *orbis terrarum* and the sky are frequently so affected.[45] The fact that Jupiter's power to punish wrongdoing extends even to the underworld adds even greater weight to the poetic sanction. Failure on the part of the poet, who aspires to immortality, to heed Jupiter's warning will result in eternal punishment, i.e., being deprived of immortal life.

The notion of limit in the natural world has an analogue in the notion of limit with respect to poetic *natura*. This notion is central to *C.* 1.3 (especially lines 21–26) and to Horace's poetics in general. In our poem Horace implies that while Jupiter is subject to no natural limits, he, Horace, is. Though like any man, he is subject to the limits of his mortal nature, he is subject to the limits of his poetic nature as well.

To sum up: Horace makes use of two stopping devices in the *namque* passage, lines 5–12. First, in 5–8 he reminds the reader of Jupiter's *fulmen*, which has been mentioned three times earlier in Book 1, in

[45] *ThLL* 4, cols. 118–21, s.v. *concutio*.

1.2, 1.3, and 1.12. In two of these passages, as we have seen, the *fulmen* is directed against potential acts of poetic impiety. In 1.34 Horace states that he has witnessed thunder in a clear sky. The extraordinary occurrence of thunder in a clear sky warns the poet to stop the poem which he has begun. Horace has sailed into forbidden poetic territory; Diespiter reveals his disapproval, and Horace stops his poetic voyage in order to avoid becoming guilty of an act of poetic *impietas*. Second, in lines 9–12 the god's power is elaborated, described as extending over all divisions of the universe and all time. The emphasis upon human life, in contrast to divine existence, also suggests the limits to which the poet's *natura* is subject. By obliquely indicating that his own power is limited, Horace furnishes further support to his original posture, that of the poet who makes small poetic offerings.

Valet ima summis mutare forms a transitional link between the preceding section of the poem, and the following clause, *insignem-promens*. In the second *quo* clause, 10 f., Horace presents a vertical cross-section of the divisions of the universe. The vertical imagery carries over into the sentence we are considering in the words *ima summis*. Looking backward, *ima summis* might well refer to the underworld and the sky. This view of the transitional function of *valet-mutare* provides a new answer to a traditional question: What is the subject of *valet*, Diespiter or *deus*?[46] Still looking backward, Diespiter is the subject, and the sentence makes explicit what was implicit in 9–12, and extends its meaning. Diespiter's power to punish extends over all divisions of the universe and is subject to no limits. Diespiter also has the power to cross these natural boundaries: he may exchange the lowest and the highest (places). If we take *deus* as the subject of *valet*, Horace seems to be saying that a god or the god can exchange the lowest and highest places, i.e., pass freely from the underworld

[46] In the views of Cruquius, Doering, and J. Gow (Cambridge 1896), Jupiter is the subject. In the passages cited by Shorey and Laing as analogues for the sentiment of *valet-mutare*, the subjects are Zeus (Hes. *Op.* 6, Arist. *Lysis.* 722), *theoi* (*Od.* 16.211, Eur. *Tro.* 608, Archil. fr. 56), *theos* (Pindar, *Pyth* 2.89), and *fortuna* (Tac. *Hist.* 4.47). For those who believe that Jupiter and Fortuna are essentially the same divinity (Kiessling–Heinze, Ullman, Hanslik, for example), it makes little difference whether *Diespiter* or *deus* is the subject of *valet*, since *deus* serves as a connecting link between Jupiter and Fortuna.

to the sky. Looking forward to the next clause (*insignem-promens* 13–14) for the meaning of *ima summis*, we find Horace talking about man's stations in life. Both *Diespiter* and *deus* have the power to change lowest and highest positions, an assertion which is made more specific by *insignem-promens*.

The *valet ima summis* / *mutare* clause states in general terms the point that Horace has made in the universalizing list of 9–12: Jupiter's power extends everywhere. Horace's subsequent reflections remain on a general level; they apply indirectly, however, to Horace's present poetic position:

> et insignem attenuat deus,
> obscura promens . . . (13–14)

A god weakens an outstanding man, bringing forth into prominence an obscure one / obscure things. *Ima summis*, as we suggested above, gives rise to a statement about the status of men. The position or station which we occupy in life is subject to divine power. Pöschl[47] and others have called attention to the similarity of this clause to line 6 of Hesiod's prayer to Zeus as lord of Dike at the opening of the *Works and Days*:

> Μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν ἀοιδῇσιν κλείουσαι
> δεῦτε, Δί' ἐννέπετε, σφέτερον πατέρ' ὑμνείουσαι·
> ὅντε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε,
> ῥητοί τ' ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς μεγάλοιο ἕκητι.
> ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει, 5
> ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
> ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
> Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.

In the line of Hesiod there are two adjectives used substantively, both in the accusative singular. Since ἀρίζηλος and ἄδηλος are adjectives of two terminations, ἀρίζηλον and ἄδηλον may be masculine, feminine, or neuter. Horace has used two adjectives of equivalent meaning, but varies the forms. *Insignem* is accusative singular, masculine or feminine of a two termination adjective; *obscura* is neuter plural.

Bentley objected to Horace's inconsistency in gender and number and

[47] Pöschl, "Die Einheit der ersten Römerode," *HSCP* 63 (1958) 339.

wanted to read *insigne*.[48] Only Reckford seems to have appreciated the change which Horace has made. He adduces *C.* 1.7.15 f. (*albus ut obscuro deterget nubila caelo / saepe Notus . . .*), where change in nature serves as analogue for vicissitude in human life, and comments,

> Although there are no clouds in 1.34, *obscuro* reappears suggestively in *obscura promens*, the coming forth of a metaphoric darkness.[49]

Since metaphoric darkness represents *res adversae* or *mala fortuna*, *insignem-promens* also means, "A god weakens the power of a prominent man, bringing forth dark things," i.e., misfortune. But since future events are obscure or unknown, *obscura promens* may also refer to the disclosure of hidden things, future events known to a god but not to men.[50]

Horace's statement differs from Hesiod's in one other respect. The line of Hesiod contains two main co-ordinate verbs, which are opposite in meaning. Horace makes the second verb in his sentence subordinate by using a participle instead of a co-ordinate finite verb. By making *attenuat* the main verb and subordinating *promens*, Horace places greater emphasis on the deity's ability to bring down an outstanding man than on his ability to bring a lowly one into prominence. This emphasis contributes to the poet's general sense of contingency, but the statement does not, I think, apply primarily to the poet. Success, fame, notoriety, did not enter into the poetic posture which Horace took at the beginning of the poem. The poet's posture is dependent upon someone else's success, however, and this is the main point of the final sentence of the poem, as we shall see below.

We have seen how Horace's statement differs from Hesiod's. Horace has taken success out of the hands, so to speak, of Zeus, Lord of Justice, and placed it in the hands of an unspecified divine power. This raises

[48] Müller cited other cases in which Horace juxtaposes masculine and neuter forms, but these are instances of a different sort: 4.2.37, *quo nihil maius meliusve terris fata donavere*, where the neuter predicate modifiers refer to Augustus; and 2.15.13, *privatus illis census erat brevis, commune magnum*, where the appositional phrase is placed in the neuter. P. Hofman Peerlkamp in his commentary (Amsterdam 1862[2]) makes the general observation that neuter plurals are common in statements describing vicissitude in human life, citing, among others, Arist. *Lysis.* 772 ff., Livy 2.9, 32.7, Manil. 4.91, Tac. *Hist.* 4.47.

[49] Reckford (above, note 11) 527.

[50] For this sense of *obscura*, cf. *caecos / eventus* in *Aen.* 6.157 f., and Eur. *Alc.* 782–86, especially τὸ τῆς τύχης γὰρ ἀφανές 785.

the possibility that another divinity, not necessarily a just one, controls success. It is this possibility which Horace takes up in the final sentence of the poem, to which we now turn:

hinc apicem rapax
Fortuna cum stridore acuto
sustulit, hic posuisse gaudet.

The first two words of the poem's final sentence, *hinc apicem*, show that the attention of the reader should remain focused on the man who is marked out from other men. Mention of the *apex* in effect specifies *insignem* (12), that is it is the man outstanding because he possesses the *apex* who is of concern to the poet.

Kiessling-Heinze comment:

> Bei den Königen (*regum apices* III 21, 20), die Fortuna entthront und einsetzt, man Horaz an den raschen Wechsel der parthischen Herrscher gedacht haben . . .

Shorey and Laing note,

> . . . properly the pileus or conical hat of a flamen. Here tiara, i.e., of eastern kings, and so a symbol of royalty. Cf. 3.21.30. But Horace may be thinking of the legend of Tarquin, Livy, 1.34.[51]

These quotations, typical of the remarks of commentators, raise three main questions: 1) What is the relevance, if any, of the fates of the eastern monarchs, Tyridates and Phraates, to Horace's poem? 2) What is the relevance, if any, of the priestly *apex*? and 3) What is the symbolic value of the *apex*? Does it refer obliquely to a specific example or to specific examples, as Kiessling-Heinze and others suggest, or is it a symbol of political power in general?

C. 2.2.17–25 is an analogue to 1.34.14–16:

redditum Cyri solio Phraaten
dissidens plebi numero beatorum
eximit Virtus, populumque falsis
dedocet uti

vocibus, regnum et diadema tutum
deferens uni propriamque laurum,
quisquis ingentis oculo irretorto
spectat acervos.

[51] According to Nisbet–Hubbard, Horace "conflates with this story of the eagle (Livy 1.34.8, Cic. *Leg.* 1.4, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 3.47.3) a reference to Fortune crowning and uncrowning Kings," as in Plut. *Fort. Alex.* 326e, Dio 63.5.2.

Here *virtus*, not *Fortuna*, is the subject, but like Fortuna, *virtus* bestows an abstract *regnum et diadema* (the equivalent of *apicem*). Her gift, however, the conquest of greed, is greater than any kingdom and crown. Furthermore, it is *tutum*—not subject to the caprices of fortune, to which political power is liable, as the fates of Phraates and Tiridates show.

Political power is uncertain, but *virtus* is independent of vicissitudes. A passage in 3.29, often cited as an analogue for 1.34.14–16 because of its similar description of Fortuna, illustrates this complex of motifs:

> Fortuna saevo laeta negotio et
> ludum insolentem ludere pertinax
> transmutat incertos honores,
> nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna.
> laudo manentem; si celeris quatit
> pennas, resigno quae dedit et mea
> virtute me involvo probamque
> pauperiem sine dote quaero.

In both 1.34 and 3.29 Fortuna is represented as winged. She takes pleasure in being malicious in 3.29 (*saevo laeta negotio*); similarly, in 1.34 she snatches away the *apex* and takes pleasure in bestowing it elsewhere. She transfers her favor from one person to another (*nunc mihi, nunc alii* 3.29; *hinc . . . hic* 1.34). She bestows *incerti honores* in 3.29 and snatches away the *apex* as the whim strikes her in 1.34. (Recall *virtus' intaminatis honoribus* 3.2.18 and her *regnum et diadema tutum* 2.2.21.) In 3.29, the poet is safe because of his disengagement, *virtus*, and *pauperies*, and because the Dioscuri protect what I regard as his poetic voyage (57–64). Maecenas, however, because he is involved in public affairs, is not safe, and is exposed to the *ludus Fortunae*.

Fortuna is often associated in Horace's verse with uncertainty in political events and military success. Thus in 2.1.1 ff. the *ludus Fortunae* and *periculosae plenum opus aleae* are items in the catalogue of subjects treated by Pollio in his account of recent civic *stasis*. Likewise, toward the end of 1.35, Horace prays to Fortuna that she may watch over the safety of Caesar and the Roman army, engaged in foreign campaigns.[52]

[52] In *C.* 4.14, stanza 10, Drusus' military successes are said to have been due to Fortune's favor; in 4.4.71–end, the victories of the Claudians are attributed to Jupiter's protection.

The final statement of 1.34, then, is an observation that high political power is subject to the whims of Fortune. Rome had seen more than enough examples illustrating this general truth. As Plüss, Wili, and Perret have suggested (above, notes 12–14), the individual to whom it was currently applicable was Caesar himself. For if even the victor at Actium is subject to the malicious whims of Fortuna, how can the poet embark upon the great sea of contemporary history? Instead of the plea that he is not equal to the task of praising the great man, Horace intimates that the great man is not in some sense equal to the task of being praised.

Some commentators have pointed out that the description of Fortuna at the end of 1.34 as one who takes away and bestows the *apex* may be indebted to Livy 1.34.8 and 9, where a portent experienced by Tarquinius is described. The winged creature in the Livy passage is not Fortuna, but Jupiter's eagle, which swoops down, removes Tarquinius' *pilleus*, bears it aloft, and then replaces it. If this picture is before Horace's eyes, the *hinc-gaudet* statement takes on quite a different meaning. It means that Fortuna, perhaps as Jupiter's minister, has removed and then replaced someone's *apex*, an action which betokens future greatness. In this case, *hinc . . . hic* means not "from one person to another," but "from here . . . to here (the same place)." The tenses of the verbs *sustulit* and *posuisse* are interpreted differently also. If the Fortuna statement is an observation of a general truth, then *sustulit* and *posuisse* are gnomic perfects.[53] But if the Tarquinius portent is relevant, then the tenses all express time, not aspect: Fortuna lifted up the *apex* and takes pleasure in having replaced it.

[53] Most editors interpret them thus. So Shorey and Laing, Bentley, Müller, Orelli–Baiter–Hirschfelder, G. Dillenberger (Bonn 1867). Porphyrio's paraphrase and Dacier's translation also imply this interpretation. Wickham in his 1912 edition departs from the traditional view. He comments on *sustulit:*

> Like *posuisse* a proper perfect, not as I took it in earlier editions aoristic. The time from which both are dated is "gaudet". She has snatched away from one and is rejoicing at having placed on another. All passes in a moment of time "cum stridore acuto," with a sharp whistle of her wings.

It is likely that there are three options for *sustulit* and *posuisse*: true tense, instantaneous aspect, and gnomic sense. While I believe that the true tense gives the predominant meaning, the other two options also come into play: what Fortune does as a general rule, and the swiftness and suddenness of her action. We recall also the archaic usage of the perfect infinitive in *-isse* for the present.

Someone, then, by the grace of Fortuna, now possesses an *apex*. Among the signs of future greatness which Octavian received as a child was the following:

> Ad quartum lapidem Campanae viae in nemore prandenti ex inproviso aquila panem ei in manu rapuit, et, cum altissime evolasse, rursus ex inproviso leniter delapsa reddidit. (Suetonius, *Divus Aug.* 94)

Augustus did not experience a portent involving an *apex*. The *hinc-gaudet* statement represents an idealized and composite picture. As a boy, Octavian received a sign of future greatness similar to that received by Tarquinius Priscus, a sign which came from Jupiter's winged minister, an eagle. Octavian now holds high power, but the fact that Fortuna bestowed it upon him renders his position tenuous. Fortuna both rejoices in transferring the *apex*, symbol of high political power, and rejoices in having now bestowed it upon a particular person, Octavian. Caesar is under Jupiter's protection, but the events which brought him to power and keep him there are not under even Jupiter's control.

There is one further twist in this complex poem. The *apex* was, among other things, a conical-shaped hat worn by the *flamines* and other orders of Roman priests.[54] At the beginning of the poem Horace pictured himself in the role of the humble worshipper. At the end he suggests the role of Roman priest whose identity the reader must infer. What does such a posture imply? What service to the state would an official poet-priest render? The answer, I believe, is that he would write national poetry in support of the new regime. The poet who assumes the posture of priest in the service of the state is subject to the whims of Fortuna. Why?

The usual basis for the apology of the poet is a professed sense of inadequacy to do justice to the great deeds of a great leader. This stance implies a criterion of parity between the magnitude of the subject and the magnitude of poetic ability. Refusal made on these grounds is, in itself, complimentary. It serves the double purpose of enabling the poet to praise the subject and simultaneously to free

[54] Cruquius, Wickham, and Shorey and Laing mention the priestly *apex* in their notes. For the priestly *apex* or *pileus*, see C. Daremberg and E. Saglio, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités grecques et romaines*, s.v. *pileus*; and Pauly-Wissowa, *RE* Bd. 1^2 cols. 2699 f., s.v. *apex* and Bd. 20^2 cols. 1328–30, s.v. *pilleus*.

himself from the obligations of writing an uncongenial poem with the mask of poetic scruple. There is more involved in 1.34, however, than poetic scruple.

The poem begins with the role of *parcus deorum cultor et infrequens*. Here the posture is (implied) poetic insufficiency. But the poem ends with political insecurity, which imposes a limitation on the would-be poet-priest. Here the scruple is political. The *apex*, symbolizing the role of poet-priest in the service of the state, is as subject to the whims of Fortune as the *apex* which symbolizes supreme political power. The reader must infer the logical relation between the two, which is a causal one: because the holder of high political power is subject to unstable political events, and may experience sudden and arbitrary change, the poet-priest suffers a corresponding limitation. The possible recurrence of civil strife renders the position of Caesar, and therefore that of Horace, insecure. As a result, national poetry is out of the question. It seems likely, therefore, that the other poetic undertaking which Horace was forced to abandon was an encomiastic poem about Caesar.

In conclusion, the change which Horace makes in 1.34 is a poetic one. He turns his boat of song back (*retrorsum / vela dare*), desisting from a poetic voyage. He announces his intention of returning to *relicti cursus*, very probably the customary themes of wine and love which he had temporarily abandoned. He is compelled to do so by a portent from Jupiter, just as he is forced by Apollo to stop writing about Caesar's *res gestae* in 4.15.

Horace characterizes himself as a humble worshipper. His small offerings befit his small means, and as in 4.2.53 ff., represent his small verse. He who wishes to write large verse (like Iullus Antonius) must make large offerings, since greater poems require more divine aid. To have embarked upon the "other" poem was an *error*. Horace's poetic skill (*sapientia*) was artistically misguided (*insaniens*).

In 1.34 Jupiter's thunder serves a function similar to that performed by Jupiter's thunderbolt in 1.3 and 1.12. Both make the poet desist from a course which is potentially impious. It was wrong or impious for Horace to have embarked upon the "other" poem. Jupiter's power, especially, by implication, his power to punish, transcends all bounds of the universe. Divine power is implicitly contrasted with

human power, inherently limited by men's mortality. It is also implicitly contrasted with poetic power. Divine power is not subject to natural limits; poetic power is.

In the *valet-mutare* clause, Horace introduces the subject of power and its relation to change. He proceeds from a general reflection (*valet-mutare*) to two statements which become successively more specific. The power to exchange lowest and highest is in the hands of Diespiter and a *deus*, and divine power (*deus*) brings down the mighty. With *insignem-promens*, Horace focuses attention upon a single outstanding individual. In the closing statement of the poem, we learn that Fortuna shifts the *apex* of the ruler and the *apex* of the would-be poet-priest at whim. This statement indirectly reveals the content of the other poem which Horace was compelled to stop writing.

Horace's position at the end of 1.34 is equivocal. He has raised the possibility through the ambiguity of *hinc-hic* and the eagle portent that Fortuna as Jupiter's winged minister is watching over the destiny of Caesar. Yet he has also taken the view that Fortuna is maliciously indifferent in her assignation of political power. Horace concludes *C.* 1.35 with a formal prayer to Fortuna for the safety of Caesar and the Roman army. The prayer is interrupted by five and one half lines of passionate invective against civil war, then resumed with a sham request:

> o utinam nova 38
> incude diffingas retusum in
> Massagetas Arabasque ferrum!

The request is not a proper one to address to Fortuna, but serves at least as a statement of the problem for the benefit of Caesar and anyone else who is listening. The political task at hand, as Horace said several times (1.2.51–52, 1.12.52–56, 3.5.2–4) is to put an end to civil war and to direct Rome's military energies against foreign enemies. Only then perhaps would Horace consider admitting encomium of Caesar into his lyrics.